Injunction to Restrain Husband from Proceeding with Foreign Divorce Action Denied by Miles, James R.
INJUNCTION TO RESTRAIN HUSBAND FROM PROCEED-
ING WITH FOREIGN DIVORCE ACTION DENIED
Arpels v. Arpels
9 App. Div. 2d 336, 193 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1959)
This was an action by a wife to restrain her husband, a French citizen,
from proceeding with a French divorce action in which personal jurisdiction
over her had been obtained while she was visiting friends in France. The
wife had obtained in an earlier separation action in New York, a consent
decree incorporating a separation agreement entitling her to $18,000 a year
alimony and a $10,000 life insurance policy on her husband; however, the
latter provision would terminate if he obtained an absolute divorce in any
jurisdiction on grounds recognized in New York. The trial court issued a
temporary restraining order against the husband upon the wife's allegation
that her husband was not domiciled in France, stressing the possible injustice
and hardship to the wife.' Defendant in fact kept in France a year round
residence, staying in a hotel when in New York. The Appellate Division re-
versed, dismissed the complaint and denied the wife's motion for a temporary
injunction2 on the ground that any possible injury to the wife could be
prevented when the decree was sought to be recognized in New York; point-
ing out that it would be an extraordinary insinuation of domestic power into
the judicial action of a foreign nation to restrain citizens of a foreign nation
from prosecuting actions in their own courts against parties who are not
United States citizens.3
The court relied on the different results which follow from refusing to
enjoin a divorce action in a foreign country and the same action in a state
court, where both actions are based on fraudulent domicile.4 A decree of
divorce of a sister state must be accorded full faith and credit in another
state if the sister state had jurisdiction of the subject matter, meaning the
plaintiff was domiciled there, in fact.3 The determination of domicile by
the sister state will be prima facie evidence of the fact of domicile.6 However,
"the basis of recognition of judgments of foreign nations is comity; and this
is a recognition which depends, when the last word is said, upon the policy
and sense of justice of the domestic court." 7
1 Arpels v. Arpels, 17 Misc. 2d 471, 187 N.Y.S.2d 100 (1959).
2 Arpels v. Arpels, 9 App. Div. 2d 336, 193 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1959). The hardships
and injustices include the necessity for her to go abroad to defend the action; the find-
ing of her fault without her being able to defend herself except with difficulty; and
the use of her name by the second wife along with other marital rights.
3 Supra note 2, at 758. The court emphasized the close connection between the
husband and France, noting that he probably was not domiciled in New York, the
lack of any showing that her alimony rights would be harmed and that the separation
agreement itself anticipated a possible later divorce action in any other jurisdiction.
4 Supra note 2, at 757.
5 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Williams v. North Carolina,
325 U.S. 226 (1945).
6 Supra note 5.
7 Arpels v. Arpels, supra note 2, at 757. Accord Gould v. Gould 235 N.Y. 14, 138
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New York courts have continually enjoined a spouse who attempts a
divorce action in a sister state whenever they feel that the domicile was a
sham.8 The reason being that a court has the power to restrain a person
admittedly within their jurisdiction from proceeding with a divorce based on
fraudulent domicile in another jurisdiction. 9
In the recent case of Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum0 which involved a
husband who had gone to Mexico for one day to prosecute a divorce there,
the court denied an injunction restraining the husband from proceeding with
his divorce action. The language of the decision is susceptible of interpreta-
tion on either of two grounds; first, the distinction between recognition of
decrees of a sister state and a foreign nation, ". .. Thus, under comity
-as contrasted with full faith and credit-our courts have power to deny
even prima facie validity to the judgments of foreign countries for policy
reasons, despite whatever allegations of jurisdiction may appear on
the face of such foreign judgments."'1 Another view of the Rosenbaum
decision relies on the conceded invalidity of the Mexican divorce and the
rationale that it was worthless and hence could not harm the wife at all.
This latter view of Rosenbaum, which the dissent in the principal case
adopts,' 2 is illustrated by the following: "The issue . . . is, simply whether
the drastic remedy of injunction may be employed to restrain . . . a con-
cededly invalid divorce action in a foreign country . . . ... ; ' and that the
decree was "of no more validity than a so-called mail-order divorce .... ,14
The court reached a proper result in the principal case by refusing to
enjoin even temporarily a French citizen from proceeding with a French
divorce action against his wife, a foreign citizen, even though the French
court had obtained personal jurisdiction over her. The distinction between
decrees of sister states under the full faith and credit clause and foreign
nation decrees can not be pushed too far, however. A court will refuse
N.E. 490 (1923). For a general discussion of when state courts will refuse to recognize
foreign divorce decrees, see I Rabel, The Conflict of Laws, A Comparitive Study, 500
et seq. (2d ed. 1958).
8 Hammer v. Hammer, 303 N.Y. 481, 104 N.E.2d 864 (1951); Garvin v. Garvin,
302 N.Y. 96, 96 N.E.2d 721 (1951).
9 Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 96 (Tentative draft no. 4, 1957) "A state can
forbid a person, who is subject to its jurisdiction, to do an act in another state"; Clark,
Equity § 13 (1954); McClntock, Equity § 172 (2d ed. 1948); See Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d
1240 (1957); Annot., 128 A.L.R. 1467 (1940).
10 309 N.Y. 371, 130 N.E.2d 902 (1955). Noted in 42 Iowa L. Rev. 326 (1957);
69 Harv. L. Rev. 1327 (1956); 7 Syracuse L. Rev. 335 (1956); 30 St. John's L. Rev.
290 (1956) ; 41 Cornell L.Q. 728 (1956). Speculation in these notes included the ques-
tion as to the result in a case like the principal one where it was unclear whether there
was a valid domicile; see e.g., 26 Fordham L. Rev. 327 (1957). The Rosenbaum case
was followed in New York in Vesci v. Vesci, 15 Misc. 2d 791, 181 N.Y.S.2d 221 (1958);
Simone v. Simone, 11 Misc. 2d 255, 173 N.Y.S.2d 890 (1958).
11 Rosenbaum, supra note 10, at 903.
12 Arpels, supra note 2, at 762.
13 Rosenbaum, supra note 10, at 903.
14 Rosenbaum, supra note 10, at 904.
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recognition of a foreign nation decree when the decree is obnoxious to the
public policy of the state. 15 However, in a state where divorce is permitted,
the public policy argument reduces itself simply to the question of whether
there was due notice and a valid domicile in the other jurisdiction.
There is no valid point in relying as a distinction upon the name of
an inquiry, either jurisdiction in other state decrees or public policy in
foreign nation decrees, when the same question must be answered; was the
spouse domiciled in the other jurisdiction? This is so because the foreign
decrees are in fact nearly always recognized unless the wife can come for-
ward and show her spouse was not domiciled in the other jurisdiction, as in
Mexican mail-order divorces.' 6 In fact, the wife has not been allowed to at-
tack the jurisdiction of the foreign court when she appeared there and failed
to contest the action.17
Both Rosenbaum and the principal case indicate that the New York
courts are quite aware of their obligation to foreign nations not to interfere
prematurely in foreign nation divorce actions. The court in Rosenbaum has
shown they will not interfere when the domicile is a sham, nor will they
interfere, as in the principal case, when domicile is in dispute. The loss of
certain matrimonial rights which result from a divorce abroad such as the
use of her name by a second wife and the loss of her husband's companion-
ship as well as the hardship of defending the action abroad are, in the
court's view, not as important considerations as respect and trust of foreign
courts and countries. The New York courts will in the future, regardless
of domicile, simply refuse to enjoin a foreign nation divorce. The decision
was a sound one because of the admirable restraint of the court in refusing
to interfere in a foreign tribunal unless clear injury of a substantial nature
is shown. Clear injury of a substantial nature is not likely to be shown in
the future either, because property rights can be protected by refusing recog-
nition of the decree in so far as alimony rights are concerned. A state's
matrimonial and divorce policy, while important in that state, should not
stray beyond that state's borders or legitimate interests-especially on the
international scene-where respect and trust for each nation's courts should
be paramount.
James R. Miles
15 Schnieder v. Schnieder, 232 App. Div. 71, 248 N.Y. Supp. 802 (1931); Gould v.
Gould, 235 N.Y. 14, 138 N.E. 490 (1923). cf. Martens v. Martens, 284 N.Y. 363, 31
N.E.2d 489 (1940).
16 See cases collected in Grossman, New York Law of Domestic Relations § 967
et seq. (1947 plus 1959 supp.).
17 Schnieder v. Schnieder, supra note 15.
